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Yale University I The recent increased focus on the LDC untemploymenit problem takes many forms; like development itself, the isSue is complex and many faceted. But perhaps no link in the chain of attempted understandilng has been as uncertain and controversial as the question of the range of technology choice actually phvsically open to the contemporary LDC in its nonagriculturAl sector-even if it were of a mind to listen to relevant advice on the subjeCt. This paper is intended to throw some light on the particular question of LDC industrial sectors' ability to efficiently absorb Lliemployed or underemployed labor in the course of the developmenlt process. We know that in the past even where countries have been growing at 5 or 6 percent annually in real terms-anid overall growth hias generally been quite satisfactory in the 1960s, as the Pearson Commissioni records-indutlrial sector growth rates of from 8 to 10 percent anlnually have been accompanied by labor absorption rates of only 2-3 percenit. Moreover, the elasticity of industrial emiployment with respect to Olut plut h5as not only beeli low but also apparently falling over time.
t Consequenitly, virtually everywhere in the LDC world some combined index of utnemiiploymnent or underemployment seems to have been on the rise-and accompaniied by an even more pronotunced rise in the awareness of the inadequacy of per capita income as the main indicator of adequate performance.
Whern this somber historical record is combined with the fact that, even if "zero population growth," policies were adopted everywhere tomorrow, the age structure of the present LDC population would yield a labcr force explosion of major proportions (close to 3 percent annually over the next decade or so), the climensions of the problem become clear. lf the developing world should be unable to absorb these inevitable projected additions to their labor force-never mind mopping up the substantial pool of underemployment already in existence in most places-the prospects are indeed grim.
The role of the industrial sector in this context-even when we define it broadly as includinig all nonagriculture except the "spongy" services-of course tells only part of the story. Clearly, if an LDC is developing at all, ii: is likely to have to activate its preponderant agricultural sector in the process. Whether or not agricultural productivity increase in this context turns otit to be labor uising or labor displacing is extremely important to thle size of the buirden placed on noniagricultural sector absorption for any given rate of aggregate go:owth. But I shall concentrate here on the capacity of nonagricu1lure to eificiently absorb labor. Not only is there more misunderstanding on this-somehow most people seem to accept the realism of alternative scale, tenuire. and input combinations in agricuilture while holding religiously to fixed proportions in industry-but we also know, regardless of how the inquiries into the employment consequenices of the Green Revolution come out, that, over time, people inevitably will be p-ushed onit of agriculture, in the case of success, and pulled out, in tile case of failure, and that the nonagricultural sector's ability to absorb them efficiently will play a crucial role in any total balanced development story.
In Section II, i try to place the generally poor recorci of industrial labor absorption in its prop:r historical anid policy perspective. In Section 111, I advance sonle prelimilary notions of the differenitial nature *)f the innovation process over time in that context, andc in Section IV, I attempt to demonstrate the empirical releva.nce of these notions, ulinder conditions of a favorable policy environment, by reference to historical Japan and contemporary Korea and Taiwan.
I1
It has by now become part of the convenitionial wisdom to criticize the so-called import substitutioni regirne most LDCs followed during the fifties and sixties. This regime usually comprised a well-knowil syndrome of policies incliding exchange controls CUIml import licelnsing, budget deficits cuLn inflationi, aind low (sometimes negative) real rates of interest. The aim, generally speakiing, was to redirect preinldependenice traditional colonial f1ows to the creation of social and econiomic overheads anld import-replacing, consumiler-goods industries. The consequence was often a spurt in industrial output growth but of inefficient--that is, capital and import intensive-character, accompanied by the discouragenment of exports and of agricultural output, low rates of industrial employment, low rates of techinological chiange, low domestic saving rates, and a relatively heavy dependence on foreign aid.
As LDC governments ')ecame increasinigly aware of the economic costs of this set of policies, one could observe, during the sixties, a tendency, at least in some countries, to consider turning to an alternative set of policies. This set can be characterized, if again at the cost of oversimplification, as aiming at a reduction of some of the gross inefficiencies attending industrial development through the readjustmenit of a number of crucial, previously distorted, .lative prices, including the exchange rate and the interest rate. By replacing quantitative controls in the foreign exchange market with tariffs and moving toward niore realistic exchange rates, via either a de jLure or de facto devaluation, and replacing severe credit rationing with higher interest rates, developmental access and participation could now be offered to mnedium-and small-scale industrial entrepreleurs for the first time. in the course of this second phase, industrial development is based less on natural and more on1 huLmian resoLurces; export substitution occurs, that is, new exports, especially of a nontraditional, labor-using variety, no loniger cliscriminated against, begin to expand; domestic saving rates begin to move up into the "take-off" range; agriculture is no longer fettered by unfavorable terms of trade and can begin to play its historical role in earnest, that is, generating surpluses whichi, whenl successfully channeled, provide simultaneous employment opportullities for the unskilled labor force being released; and indigenous technological change in both sectors can assume much greater importance.
While there exists as yet no marked trend towarcd such "export sLubstitution" policy packages in thie less developedl worldc generally, its adoption has indeed had remarkable results-for example, in Korea, Taiwan, and West Pakistan-in turning some situations of virtual overall stagnation in the fifties into high growth situations in the sixties.
Perhaps most important for us here is the fact that the new and better signals in this phase are likely to induce the adoptionl of different, more labor-using, or.unemployment-reducing, technologies andc output mixes. In this context, the vital role, for better or worse, of techlnological flowvs between rich and poor countries inevitably comes into play. The very coexistence of countries at very different levels oF techniology has to represent one of the most important influences oni the performance of LDCs. past, present, and prospective. It is the precise nature of these technological flows, and the way in which they ha-le been accommodated by LDCs, which has, in my view, had a decisive imipact o0i overall per-'fomance during these past 2 decades of development. Alternatively put, it is also in this area ila which the greatest potential for improved LDC performance in the scveenties on both output and employmnenit grounds can and must be located.
Under the inlllLence of the record of the past, many have concluded that a conflict between these two objectives is inevitable. But before we accept such fuLnclamentally clismal conclusions we have an obligationi to carefully examine the vaiidity of the proposition, especially in countries which seem to have performied well with respect to both output and ernployment growth in the past. Certainly SUCIh an examination is n1ecessary Econonmic Development and Ctultural Chanige before we can intelligently acidress the questioni of how the LDC world as a whole will be able to efficiently absorb the inevitable projected additions to their labor force, not to mentioni the existing backlog of the uLnemployed and underemployed.
As we look inito the 1970s, thiee major schiools of thought seem to be emerging with respect to the solutioll of the Llnemploynient problem. One suggests we need more growth, that is, a hiigher growth rate, traditionally arrived at, withi enoughi "trickle clown" to achieve full employmelit. This is clearly, at best, an expensive and unrealistic proposition, requirinig huge volu.mes of foreign capital, Ior instance, if the rickety, import-substitLItionldominated macihinery of the sixties is to yield, withioLut restruicturilig, substantially more employment. The second approach also assumes no major parameter shift in the behavioral relationis of the system. It suggests, however, that after the traditional planninig exercise lhas been consummated, a " supplemenitary strategy" must be employed to mop tIp the remaininig unemployed. This customarily means institutilng labor-intensive public works programs. There is a real possibility here, especially where the rural infrastructure, for example, is inadequate. but evidence to date indicates that blueprintinig and executing capacity may be a constraint as one goes from project to project. But most important, this approacih fails to make the employment issue part of' the primary strategy ol developmenit and relegates it to an afterthouglht, which-despite all 5-year-plan protcstat ions to thie contrary--was es.;entially the situiationi in the 1950s and i960s.
The third approachl attem)pts to chanige the naltule of the growth pattern itseit by making it imore responsive to the factor endowvimenit. This means that Nse don't try to "dethrone the GNP," except perhaps in political termr,s, but we try to place it on a "sturdier throne." In other words. oncP, the open dualistic economy moves oLut of its -idniinisteredprice, import-substitution hothouse andc into a ..iore market-oliclited, export-substitution phase, it hecomie, possible fror major cficient chalnges in output mix and techinology-both in a labor-usilIg diretioll-to take place. SucIh restructuring, as can be demonstratedl in the cases of Taiwan and Korea, may permit the economiiy to have mcore of both, that is, more output audnI more employmenit, r athier thani having to make a choice betweenl theli. Moreover, sucih a move toward Imlore imlarket-oriented signals has absolutcly nothing to do. as it is sometimes alleged, with a return to colonialisimi or hanidinig thIe COulilty over to lnbridled free enterprise. The same dc-;irability of lettinig the endrowmenit "be h1eard1'' in productioLn decisions applies to the socialist coLutitries; anid, in fact, the market is increasinigly being tised as a tool of socialist planning, and in pLirsuit of' socialist objecti,ves, In Eastern Europe today.
Fiinally, we shotild note that incomile distributioll, a third and increasingly important dimensioii ofdevclopniental performance, also stancds to beniefit. Tlhere are those whio assuime that anly tendenicy at wage restraint at low levels, in keeping with the contlitioni o' labor sLirplus, must be bad for the "little man." In fact, quite the opposite is likely to be the case. Where the )overty problem is in considerable part an unemployment problem-due to the government's unlwillingness or inability to redistribute fiscally-those who are hurt by wage restraint are the already employed or labor elite, not the utisually disenfranicihised, uinemployed, or uLideremnployed. Not only total output, and hience per capita income, but also the wage bill is likely to rise once the economy moves to efficienit labor-intensive technologies andc ouItput mixes. FiguL-cs on income dlistribution in a numlllber of couL1tries interestinigly enough indicate that TaiwanI is the best performer here as well, that is, sporting the maost equal (listribution ol incomiie in the sample. Even more instructive is the fact that Taiwan shows up as a m11UCh better performer on this COunit in 1964-wvheni export substitutioll wvas in iull swing-thani in 1953--duLing, its import-substitutioln phase. While economiiists who are conditionied to tlhink always in term-1s of trade-offs will hate to admit it, labor sUrpIlIS dlevelopitng counltries, well witilin their efficiency frontier, may be able--with the riglht policy clanges-to enjoy more employment, more growtlh, and more incoine distributioll at the same time.
With this realization, a lot more attentioni is n1ow being paid to the importance of factor price distortions, over-valued exchanige rates, inappropriate fiscal policies, "premature" welfare legislation, and other institutional constrainits whlicih have o)bviouily conitributedC to the low rate of labor utilization, especially in the LDCs' growinig nonagriculItural sectors. But 111mUCI less attent;ioI has beci pa)id to date to thle aIctual technIological chloices available to the typical LDC-'on the aSSuIm1ptiOn1 itS entreprelneUrs and government officials coticl be broughlt to the point of facing a more reliable set of signals relative to the existing factor cndloWlmenit aid skill capacities. In othel words, even if domestic fiscal, molnetary, credit, and exchanige-rate policic. were ideal, wouild the cloice of techinology ftromi the shelf available abroad anid/or pr odUcible at lholmic yield a substanitially different kindc or techimolog -or are there other, overwhelmingly severe, choice conistrainits forcing acceptanlce of techniology Cuirrently available in the most advanced of the capitail-exportingcountries?
Many LDC offici:dik. aicl donors, and scholars still share the poilnt of view that mn(ost technological chanige, especially in noniagriculture, m11USt take place abroacl and that the borrowing LDCs, in fact, have only a very narrowv set of tccnliiological clhoices openI to themil. If' olily the coefnicients attaclhing to the latest vinitagc Imlachiinery prioduICCeI ill tilC mlost advanced COUlntriCS areC relevanit, all the talk about alternative factor proportionis in response tk altern-.ative resource Ceidowvmenits bccomc" largely irrelevalit oiC restricted to chaniges in OLutpuIt mixes via tradle.
SuchI skepticism oni the scope olr technol1o0gical choicc is, ol coursc, n1ot mirclatcd to the still considerable (Ilragginig of the feet in abanidoiniing the import-substitution policy paxckage in muchI ol' the less developedl world. In spite ol' the real world (dcmonstratioil of what can, in Fact, be accom-plished, there remaini formidable obstacles to the dismantling of the import-substitution regime. Direct controls imply absolute power-as well as supplementary incomes-for the civil service, which it is loath to surrender lightly. Moreover, the inevitably greater role for private enterprise under any liberalized regime runs up against associations withi colonialism and fears of antisocial giveaways. Btit one of the more powerful argumnents on the side of conservative policy makers remains the supposed rigidity of the choices actually available. In large part it results from dediucillg ths ime.itR0ility of fixed proportions from their histolical prevalence during the import-substitutioll phase. I intend to investigate this issue by, first, attempting to elucidate the differential nature of thle innovationial process in eachi phase and then by demonstratilng the potentially substanitial scope for labor-using innovationis by reference to the cases of historical Japan and contemiiporary Korea and Taiwan.
III
First and foremost, it should be remileiibered tihat, ulllike in an advanced country where technological change is viewed as rather automatic and rouLtillized or as capable of being generated thirouLhl R & D expenditures accordinig to some rules of cost/benefit analysis, in the contemporary developinig societies techlnologicl change cnnot citlher be taken for granted or afforded thlrotugh basic R & D allccations. In thlis situation, we can;ict avoid the qucstioni of wlhat, given the oxistence of a slhell of technology from abroadt, is the pattern by wlhichi the typical less deelopeCd economny, in fact, manages to innovate. This (qLucstioll in turIl forces us to look at least at the followinig diimcnsions more carceully: (I) thie precisc nature of that technlology shell', (2) tlle availabilitv witin the LDCs of requiredl initial managerial andl entrepreneuLrial capacity, and (3) the changinag nature or that ieq Uired mal nagerial andc entrepreneurial ca licity in the course of transition to modern grrowth.
The technology slhelf developed in the matLue indUstri,li economiiies abroadl may be described by a set of Llnit activities l'ollowilg a smooth envelope curve as in tigure 1. A particLIalr techinology canl be dlescribedl by an L-shapedl contour prodLucillg one Lulnit of output withl a given pair of capital and iabor coeflicicnts. The teclhnology shelf is composed of the com1plete set of such activities or techlniologies whichi have been demollstrated to be fItasible somewhere in the advaniced counltries at some historical poitit in time, incliuting thie pres.Cent. Since there exists a number of teclinolog)y-exporting COuiitries-for example, the Uniied States, Germllany, the Uniited Kingdomn, anid Japan-with continutous technological tranisfers among themselves as well as withi the LDCs, it is not unreasoniable to postulatl;e the existcnce oh a single technological shelf tor the lending world as a whole. For example, LuInit teChn1lo0gy A 0 maly have been generated in Germany in 1920, A 1 in the Unitecd States in 1920, and A 2 in the United Statt s in 1950. In other words, as we move to the left along thie shelf we
run into more "modern" technology, that is, technology of more recent vintage and of higher capital intensity. As capital pel head increases this means that the typical worker has leanied to cooperate with more units of capital of increasing technical complexity. This capital-deepeniing process, in other words, is more complicated thani the textbook versionl of "homogeneous" labor being equipped with more units of "homogeneous" capital.
At any point in time the typical LDC is, then, theoretically free to borrow a particular unit activity from anywhere along this shelf. What technology is chosen and what happens as an immediate and ultimate consequence of that choice, that is, what secondary processes and reactions are set off, is, of course, all part and parcel of the inlovation process taken as a whole. The quality of that process, each step of the way, in turn depends on both the economic environment, that is, the nature of the relative price signals, and on the entrepreneurial, managerial, and skilled labor capacity of the borrower.
The role of innovation intist therefore be seen as intimately related to the stage in which the developing economy finds itself. In other words, the role of technological change in output and employment generation must be viewed as sensitive to the same discernible phases of growth as the econoomy moves in transitioni from open agrarianism to Kuznets's modern economic growth. In the first postindepecldence or import-substitution phase previously mentioned, an effort is made to increase the stupply of domestic entreprelleLurship and the economy's learninlg capacity, partly througlh the importation of people via aid but mainly throuLgh the system of protection established by government policies. In fact, the most reasonable explanation for the import-substitutioll syndcromiie is that it is a response to a real (or imagined) slhortage of entrepreneurshiip an(d thlat it permits time, throughl informal learning by doing or mor-e formal educational processes, for this entrepreneurial capacity to develop. In terms of figure 1, this means that, althouLgh the technological shelf may look as indicated by curve SS, the actual choices available to the developinlg counltry dLuring the import-substitutioll phase are more aptly described by S'S'. In other words, due to the inadequate state of entrepreneurial capacity during the early postindependence period of physical controls, the efficiency of generating outptit per Unlit of capital in the borrowing couLntry is likely to be substantially below that in the lending country. This is likely to be more true the more capital intensive the import, that is, the fulther removed from the cultuLal inheritance alrld experience of the borrower. Suich technological imports are often accompanied by imported engineers, even managers and SUpervisors---adding Lip to what is cailed a "turn-key project." Thle most advanced andcl sophisticated technology can, of course, be made to "work," in the plysical sense, even in the most backward developing economy. But a shinly new plant imbedded in a society many decades distant is bound to be substantially less efficient. This is trtLie for a thousand direct reasons, stich as the absence of eveen minimal skilled labor supplies, domestic subcontracting, and repair and maintenance possibilities, as well as foi imany more subtle sociological reasons which enter into the total milieu in whicil the plant is requlired to operate. The more sophlisticated andc remelovecd from the rest of the economy the technological transplanit, in other words, the greater the relative inefficiency, as indiicated by the shape of the S'S' curve. ff and wheni the economy then moves away from the import-stibstitution phase atnd enters inlto the second phase of liberalization and export substitutionl, a secondc important, if uninitenitionlal, type of inllovatioln is likely to appear, namely, a redtIction in the extent of the inefficiency of the 2 Some few couLtrics, like Malaysia, with command over a very strong and reliable natural rCsouices base, may be able to avoidl suclh a pilase altogether. MIorcover, thiere clearly exist better and worse (i.e., less and more costly) import-substitution packages to chioose fromii (e.g., comparc Brazil and Ghana), but I caninot expand( on this very iniirestingg suibjeci in the context of the present paper (see, lowever, my original transplanted technology. Call it X efficiency if you like, but the cost of the pule tra.nsplanitationi is likely to be reduIced, quite ullilitentiollally, that is, largely as a result of factors externial to the profit-maximizing behavior of the productive unit itself. This increase in productive efficiency over time will increase in quantitative significance as the import-substitution hothouse temperature is gradLually tuirned downl and a more competitive economy emerges. fn figure 1, the effects ol' graduial enhaticemenlt of efficiency may be represented by the arrows teneding, over time, to move S'S' back towar-d the original SS position.
3
Another more conscious and quantitatively more importanit type of ininovationi begins to gather importance duiring this same second phase of tranisition. This phenomenon may be called ininovationial assimilatiotninnovatinig "on top of" importcd technology in the direction of usinlg relatively more of the abundanlt unskilled labor supply. As the economy shifts fromil a natural-resource-basecd growthi pattern in the import-subStitUtiOn phase to a htiman-resouirce-based system in the export-sLubstitution phase, there is an increasing sensitivity to the continuously changing factor endlowmenit, first in terms of the efficielIt utilizationi of the domestic uliskilled-labor force, and later in terms of the incorporatioll of growing domestic skills and ingelluity. In othier words, the appropriate type of technology finally in place mllUst be one in which not only the initial choice from the shelf but also the adaptations and adjtistmients consciously maldc thereafter, in response to chaniging domestic resouIce anld capability constrainits, play an importanit role.
The more liberalized the economv, in terms of the governimielit's performing a catalytic role througil the market by indirect means rathier than trying to impose resource allocation by direct controls, the better the chances that the millions of dispersed decision maker-s can be induced, by the sheer force of profit maximization, to make the "r-ight" decision. As the gap between shadow andc market prices nrIrOWS-coupled with the expectation of continued labor surpluses for years to come-xve would expect transplantationi choices to become more flexible, tilat is, labor intensive. However, since shelf choices are likely to continue to be severely constrained-partly by a lack of illum11ination of substantial portions of it, partly by sucIh institutionial inhibitionis as prestige, aid tying, and so forthwe can realistically expect relatively less benefits fromil liberalization to accrue in the tranisplanitationi process. On the othier-liancl, we can expect much more from the assimilation type of innovationial behavior wliich now tends, for the saime reasons, to be more slanted in a labor-using dlirection. In the typical labor surplus type of economny-or one likely to become one over the next decade (as is probably the case in much of Africa)-all this means a much greater possibility for the efficient accommodation of pure labor services.
4 Whether this will lead to a sectoral output shift in favor of labor-intensive export commodities or a mix change predominantly addressed to the domestic market, of course, depends on, ceteris paribus, income elasticities of demand, the government's fiscal prowess, and the type (e.g., size) of the economy. Moreover, no strong generalizatioll as to the relative importance of shifts in output mix versus changes in techilology for given mixes is iikely to be valid. It shotild be clear, however, that the important issUe is that the search for innovation can nlow be considered a conscious activity of the individuLal entrepreneur and-given the combination of m-tore realistic relative price signals after liberalization plus greater entrepreneurial capacity-that it is likely to be mainily directed toward various forms of indigenous capital stretching on top of the imported tecInology. SUCIh capital stretchinig can be repre...-nted by a reduction in the capital coefficient per Lnit of output. The effective postassimilation set of Ullit technologies, that is, after domestic assimilation, may thuis be represented by curve S"S" in figure 1, with the strengtlh of the indigenous labor-using innovative effort indicated by the amoUIlt of the "downward" shift in the capital coefficient.
It should be noted here that a negatively slopedi techinology shelf, for example, SS, representing puire technological tranisplaintationi, permits, as we move to the left, higher labor productivity levels, but only at increasing capital cost. In a counltry characterized by capital scarcity this miay mean increased technical unemployment (a la Eckalus) and henlce a lowver value of per capita income for the economy-inl spite of the highier level of labor productivity achieved. Domestic capital stretching, however, can materially affect that situation by enabling more workers to be employed per Ullit of the capital stock. If the postassimilation unit techniology set, S"S", lor examilple, is upward sloping from left to righlt, highier latior productivity levels become consistent with lower capital/outpuIt ratios.,'
In sumtmary, once the overall policy setting has turned more favorable and permitted the economy to enter the second phase of transition, at is this indigenous capital-stretching capacity which I consider to be of the greatest importance-especially for the contemporary developing economy facing the formidable labor force explosion predicted for the seventies and eighties. lt is in this specific area also where the skepticism of planners, engineers, and aid officials generally is most pronIounced-especially with respect to the full range of technological choice really available whilen all I It is important to emphasize the word "efficient" since I am not concerned here with the, possibly also legitimiiate, objective of employment crcation as a separate social goal, to be weighied against output growth.
I The historical cvidence within individual now developed Western countries over time seems to indicate an approximation to constancy in the capital/output ratio, i.e., approximiiatinig a hlorizontal position for S"S', the "final" IOCUS of unit technologies achieved there. the dust has settled. Historical examples fro.I the Japanese case, as well as contemporai., evidence from Korea and TL iwan, permit us to demonstrate the existence and potential importance of such capital-stretching innovations for the labor surplus developing country.
IV
As has been pointed out by many observers, including Allen and Lockwood, 6 the most significant featute of the Japanese economy in the early Meiji period-which followed hard oni 2 centuries of self-imposed, nearly ;omplete isolation-was her ability to choose relatively freely from among the items on a technological shelf perfected in the West. The reopening of foreign ti . and the resumption of other related contacts, especially the flow of technical personnel in both directions, led immediately to the stimulation of technological change by direct borrowing. But while the Japanese have often been characterized as possessing a consummate ability to copy and imitate, it is noteworthy that, in fact, very soon the majority of domestic innovation activity "consisted of the adaptation of foreign techniques to domestic conditions."
7
The reasons for this relatively early move to a responsiveness of the industrial sector's technology to domestic endowment conditions are complicateL and cannot be dealt with here. Suffice it to say that postRiestoration Japan did not engage in very extensive or prolonged importsubstitution policies-partly because extraterritoriality deprived her of the ability to establish strong protective import barriers and partly because the government quite early thought it more efficient to work through the market, that is, by using taxes and subsidies rather than through extensive controls and government ownership. These government plants in directly productive areas which were established during the immediate postRestoration period were viewed mainly as pilot projects and sold off to private interests by 1890. Thus, Japani moved relatively quickly into the export-substitution phase.
In assessing the importance of capital-stretching innovations, it is useful to recognize distinctions between innovations relating to the machine proper, innovatio.,s relating to the production process as a whole (emphasizing the importance of activities within the plant but peripheral to the machine), and innovations with respect to the production process as 594-607).
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a whole (emphasizing plant size and organization at various stages of that process). With respect to machine-related, capital-stretching innovations, the simplest and quantitatively probably most important example was the running of machinery imported from the United Kingdom and the United States at rates and speeds substantially in excess of those used abroad. For example, once the kerosene lainp made night work possible, spinning could be done o01 two, sometimes tlhree, shifts claily, with but 2 or 3 rest days a month. This meant thlat the aver-age work week per machinle was two to three times that encountered in the coutntry of origin, and, since physical depreciation is mucth less important than economic obsolescence, using a machine twice as intensively does not wear it out twice as fast. This heavy tuse of machinery typical of the nineteentlh-centtury Japanese industrial sector meant that the normai gap between the phlysical and economic life of a machine was substantially narrowed and capital was considerably "stretched."
Moreover, there was a related speedup of the very same spinning machines. By running the machines at faster speeds and/or by substituting cheaper raw materials (in this case, raw cottoIn, whlichl nlecessitated a greater number of womiieni to handlc the resultanit increase in the number of broken threads), industry achieved an addtitional major saving in capital.
Certain differences in the indLustries of the two countries are important and must be noted. Th-e raw material is essentially differenlt. Thoughl thc Japanese do uise some American raw cotton, the bulk of their cotton is from India and is of shorter staple, more likely to breakage... and requilring more labor to put it through the machinery. The yarn spun has much more of the coarser counts that requir-e mnore labor.. . . By adding more labor it is run somewhat faster than Americani practice.. . . All of these factors are in some way related to the chealp labor policy. They are there because the labor is cheap. 8 Japanese spindles were equipped witlh a '-inch insteacd ol a 1-inclh front roll to accommodate the shorter staple cotton when operated at higher speeds.
For these reasons, differences in thle yaril COUnlt anid differelnces ill the speed ol the machinle as well as differences in the numllber of shifts, we find that there was a very niarkled substitution between capital and labor in the cotton-spinninlg industry. For example, Orchard reports that a competent Japanese spinner workinig on a 20-yarni COulnlt operated from 300 to 400 spindles, while an Americani spinnier on thc same yarni COUnlt telLded frlom0 1,020 to 2,688 spindles, that is, 2--7 times as many.
9 As the U.S. Tariff Commissioni reported: 'in ordler to distribute the fixedl overhleach aliarges in the way of highi interest and depreciationi costs, anid to catrn the large 8 John E. Orchiard, Jaipan's Economnic P'osilion (NcNv York: McGrawF-Hill Book Co., 1930), 1p. 367.
9 Ibid., p. 367.
amounts needed to pay a normal rate of dividend, every effort has been made to obtain the largest possible output from the expensive equipment and plant. Machinery is tlherefore run at high speed, and almost since their inception the Japainese spinning mills have been operated night and day, employing two 12-hour shifts (22 actual working hours) for an average of 27 days a month." 1 0 Here again, given a standard coUnlt of yarn, the average Japanese spinner is seen as tending 240 spindles, while the American counterpart on the same machinie tends about 1,000 spindles. As late as 1932, weekly man-hours per 1,000 homogeneouLs spindles of thle same quality ranged from 328.8 in Japan to 164.8 in the United Kinigdomii and 143.1 in the United States. A somewhat similar story canl be told with respect to cotton weaving. Once again: "The high cost of mill constructionl is considerably reduced if you consider the hours during whichi the mill is being put to effective use. So far in Japan the wheels have turned rotund durinig 20 out of 24 hours, while in Europe only 8 hours are being worked. Effective working timc in England is less than 38 houLrs per week, as 2 hours out of those are devotecl to cleaning; this is done in Japan after working houLrs." 1 2 Again, the U.S. Tariff Commission reports that "in weaving staple cottoni sheetings, the ordinary Japanese weaver seldom operates more thani two plain looms, while the American weavei', with perhaps some assistance in supplying fresh bobbins, normally tends from 8 to 10 plain looms." 1l3
Perhaps the most convincing eviclence that these adjustments along the machines proper constituted a rational response to very mar ked differcnces in factor endowments was that in weaving, in contrast to sprining, the latest aultomatic equipment from abroad was not, in fact, invariably imported. Quite frequelltly, nonautomatic looms were taken from the slhelf instead, permitting more stretching thani WoulC have been possible in the case of initially more capital-initenisive techniologies. Unlike some olf the contemporary less developed countries, japan clea rly did not wishi to '"transplant" ahead of its entrepreneulial anid skillecd labor capacities.' As the Tariff Commission put it:
The price of the automiiatic loom is more than twice that of the plain loom, whichi, with the additional expense involved in the imrportation In the case of silk produiction, wlici, with cotton, made tip nmore than 70 percent of total industrial ouItput until the turin of the century, we have similar evidence of the ability to inilovate in a capital-stretching direction on the machine proper. In raw silk, for example, the Japanese employed more thian twvice as many wvomen as did the reeling basins in Italy. In otther areas, well into the twentiethi century, Japanese railways employed 19 workers per mile of track comparecd with seven in the United States."
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In the production of prinited goods, the followinig accotint may be instruictive:
Recently, a Japanese maniufacturer of plain linoleuLmr decided to undertake the productioll of prinited goods. He dispatchied a representative to the United States to puIchiase the necessary cquipimient. The representative was familiar with the moderin linoleumII pirintinig macihine, printing several colors at one time and turning out as muchi as 1 5,000 square yards in 9 11ours, but he considered it too expensive a piece ot equipment, especially siicc his labor was being paid only about 50 cents a day, and so he sought out, in an American plant, an old hand block printing outfit. It was not for sale. Its parts were lying about in a storeroom of the factory. Some of them were 40 years old, and the whole outfit had been discardcd 15 years before. But the Japanese representative purchiased it and had it shipped to Japan. In the imimlediate outlay of capital he saved money, for lie purchiased the old equipment at the price of a printing macihine or even below the prices of a new hand outfit, but lie installed Ir lbid. A relatcd initercstinig exaniplc of techinical nexibility far beyond what most engineers are willing to adimit to is provicied by the Toyocla automatic loom, one of the f'ew indigenous Japanese inventions in this area. Subsequently manufactured by Platt's ancd Oldhanil's uncler a Japanese patent, it was advertised to require 20 workers per loom in England; 50 workers hacl always been used in Japan. "Ilbid., p. 1 13. in his plant equipment that could only have been disposed of as junk in the United States. He started in Japan a new industry in a stage of technical development that had become obsolete years before in the older industrial countries.' 8 Many of the extra workers in Japanese plarnts were not engaged on the machine proper bLit in what might be called machine-peripheral or hiandling activities. In place of mechanical conveyor belts, human conveyor belts were devised. Packaging was more often done by hand. As Orchard again reports, "At one of the largest copper smelters in Japan, clay for the lining of the furnaces is carried down from a nearby hillside on the backs of women. At the plant of the Tokyo Gas Company, coke is put into bags by hand and then carried by coolies, some of them women, to the barges in the adjacent canal. Coal, even in the larger Tokyo plants, is uinloaded by hand and carried in baskets to the power houses."' 9 The ability to substitute labor for capital in such activities peripheral to the machine proper apparently existed, and the quantitative incidence was substantial. Very often such activities were machine paced in the Hirschman sense, that is, while they might have looked wasteful to the untrained Western eye, they were, in fact, paced by well-spaced machinery as part of the same production line which contained lar ,e nuLmbers of unskilled laborers.
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A third type of capital-st-ctching innovation of whlich much use was made in historical Japan is what might be called the plant-saving variety. This is often characterized by the coexistence of different historical stages of produlctioni in the same industry. Raw silk production and cotton weaving represent outstanding examples. In the former industry, silkworm rearing and cocoonI production were handled mainly by farmers' wives in small homemade sheds, extensions ot the rural households. In cotton weaving, most of the yarn was "put out" to farm households, with individual looms dispersed in farm houses and worksheds. But even in the more modern factory-style spinning industry, preparatory and finishing processes were carried out largely at the cottage level.
This rather remarkable survival of domestic industry on a subcontracting basis must be explained largely in terms of the exploitation of complementarities between many small labor-intensive operating units and the large industrial-maniagement unit. The traditional merchant middleman, as a representative of the subcontracting unit, served as both supplier and market for the goods to be worked up domestically. A specialization of fiunctions as between workshops, even as between the members of a given family, developed. One-roof economies could be achieved in this fashion, that is, by using cheap labor in cooperation with old-fashioned Ibid., p. 246. Ibid., p. 255. 20 This is very similar to contemporary metlhods of construction withl the use of reinforced concrete in India and Pakistan. Here a cement mixer is linked to the final pouring of thie concrete by a long chain of workers passing thle cement from hand to hand; the cement is put in place just before it is r eady to cool and harden. machinery at the workshop level, while economies cC scale couild be achieved in the financing, purchasing, and merchandising stages. 2 l he continued relative importance of this household type of enterprise is quite remarkable; cottage-style industry contributed more tlhan two-thirds of industrial output in 1878, almost 60 percent in 1895, and retained substantial importance well into the twentieth century. Not only lacquLerware, pottery, porcelain, sake, fruit and fish canning but also suLch new consumer goods coming to the fore over time as bicycles, electric lamps, and rubber exhlibited the same characteristics.
1[
Purchase or construction of plants amouLnts to more thani 50 percenit of total investment in plant and eqtuipment in most couLntries. The ability to utilize houselholds for putting-out operations, and thus rieduce expenditures on a plant, undoubtedly amounted to a major kind of capital-stretchinig innovation. By scattering familiar but improvinig macllillery over large numbers of scattered miniiplants, large amouLnts Of Lliskilled labor could be deployed in both direct productioni and in satisfying the resulting increased demand for transportation and handlinlg activities. In this fashion, Japanese entrepreneurs were able to, first, incorporate puLe labor services and, later, domnestic ingenuity and skills into the industrial production processes, largely for export.
An examination of the capital/labor ratio in the nonaglricultural sector' in Japan during the period discussed indicates the eflectiveness of capitalstretclhing innlovations at the aggregative level; whvile the average ainnual rate of capital deepening was 4.3 percent between 1906 andc 1917, the earlier period, between 1892 and 1900, was chairacter-ized by capital deepening at a rate of 2.8 percent annually, declininig to 1.7 percenlt between 1900 and 1906.
This seems to at least suggest that Japanese entrepreneurs were getting better and better, through a learning-by-doinig process, at ininovatilig ill a relatively labor-using direction, before the Linlimiiitecl suplply of labor condition came to an end as the reserve army of dke unlemiiployecl and underemployed was substantially mopped Llp after World War t.
In contemiiporary Korea, devaluation in 1964 arid a major interest rate reform in 1965 laid the basis for suLbstantial chainges in technology as well as OultpuLt mix. Examples of capital-stretching adaptations of imported technology abounld in textiles, electronics, and plywood production. In the manufacture of silk, for example, one woman operates two looms in coiitrast to contemiiporary Japan where one womani operates 6.8 loomls. In reaction to the now r isinlg wages in Japan, Korea is taking over the lower qutality yarn spectrum where more workers can be employed to make up for the inferior quality of the raw niaterial. in cotton weaving, one worker operates tlhrCe loomI1s in Korea, four loomiis in Japani; in spinninig, the 21 "Sometimes even a single part is not completed in onc shop or homc but is shaped in one and painted or plated in anothic" (1H. G. Aubiey, "Small Induistry in Economic Development," Social Research 18, no. 3 [Scptember 1951]: 269-312). contrast is between 600 and 900 spindles. Moreover, Korean machinery is rtun for three 8-hour shifts daily as contrasted with only two such shifts in J'apan. Peripheral to the machines proper, the contemporaly Japanese use a conveyor belt system, for example, between the carding, gilling, and combing operations, which is replaced by human hands in Korea.
In the production of plywood, what at first appears as production processes very similar to those carried on in the United States, that is, fixed proportions, in fact, turn out to be quite flexible-interestingly enough mainly because of the greater machine speed combined with much more labor-intensive repair methods used. In the United States, defective pieces of lumber are cut out automatically by machine and discarded. In Japan, defective pieces of lumber are cut out by hand and the section is discarded. In Korea, defective sections are cut out by hand, the scraps saved, and the defect plugged manually. Here, once again, a lower quality raw material can be upgraded thlrough the application of cheap labor. Consequently, overall, there are twice as many workers per unit of capital equipment in Korea-123 workers are engaged per equivalenit capital productioll line as contrasted to 72 in Japan. Moreover, a Korean line is worked 22 hours a day compared to 20 in Japan. At the same time, in the production of Korean plywood, between 10 and 15 percent more workers are engaged in inspection, repair, anld maintenance of both materials in process and the machinlery in place.
in Korean electronics, machine-related, labor-using innovationis and adaptationis are most prominent. In transistor assemiibly operations, for instanlce, given wage rates ,ib of those of equivalent operators in the United States (for the same firm), the machinery is run at physical full capacity, that is, 6 days, three shifts a day, which is 20 percent above the U.S. equilvalent. Moreover, certain special operations such as feeding and packaging are LIsually done by hand on the assembly line, instead of automatically. In spite of the greater use of labor, productivity per worker seems to be higher due partly to the faster learningprocess (it was repeatedly stated that it takes at least 2 weeks less to train Korean women in assembly line work thani Americai-s) but mainly to the greater discipline and attentiveness on the assembly line throughout. For example, in one firm the difference in speed of assembly on identical equipment yields a 30 percent differenitial in output (from 68 units per machine hour to 85), and in a die-mounlting process it rises to more than 1 00 percent (from I 13 UllitS per lhour to 240). These greater speeds of operation, either due to faster machine or operator pacing, are once again accompanied by pUttinlg additional women into more intensive testing, inspection, and repair efforts than in Japan or the United States. Defective pieces are not thrown away but are repaired by hand. Similarly, with machinery itself working at physical full capacity, considerably more manpower is allocated to the maintenance and repair of the in-place capital equipmenit.
Withi respect to other organizational and plant-related technological choices, the r;ost important phenomenon is clearly subcontracting, both domestical and international. Domestically, subcontracting to local equipment and parts manufacturers is being increasingly practiced, especially in the electronics industry; sometimes, as the experience of several companies indicates, it takes 2-3 years before the domestic subcontracting supplier, via a learning-by-doing process, becomes a lower cost producer than the main plant or import alternatives. While such capital-saving inllovations, mainly via the reduction of plant and large-sca'e urbani overhead requlirements, are not yet as widespread in Korea as in historical Japan (and contemporary Taiwan), they are markedly on the increase in a number of other industries as well. Internationally, of course, accepting a suLbcontract for the labor intensive phase of a multistage and, elsewhere, technologically demanding production process is a potentially very efficient way of harnessing virtually pure labor services to the developmiienit process. Bonded export processing schemes-consisting of tariff-free zones into wvhich, often under subsidiary or subcontracting arrangements with Japanese or American firms, raw materials are imported and then reexported, after value in the form of cheap labor has been added-can be most helpful. This scheme now yields close to 20 percent of a Korean export volume which itself has been rising at ani almost incredible 30-40 percent annual rate over the past 3 years.
But it is to the larger question of the productive absorption of labor througlh chaniges in the output mix and trade that we must turn in this connection. In 1962 land-based foodstuffs and raw materials made up 75 percent of total exports, while labor-based light manufacturing industries as a whole, including plywood, raw silk, cotton textile, wigs, and footwear amounted to 15 percent. By 1968, the situation had been completely reversed, witlh 77 percent of the exports in manulfacturinig and only 14.5 percent in foodstuffs, livestock, and raw materials. It should, moreover, be noted that small-scale manufacturing exports, that is, in units of less than 10 workers (undoubtedly th.. most labor-intenisive part of the spectrurm), grew from 18.6 percent of the total in 1963 to 31.4 percent in 1968.
As a consequence of all this, manIufacturing employment doubled between 1963 and 1969, with light industry, in particular, increasing its employment at a rate even in excess of value added (see table 1).22 At least until Korea began to reverse its liberalization trend, after 1968,23 the capital/labor ratio for manufacturing as a whole actually declinied after 1964 (see fig. 2 ). There is also evidence, for example in table 2, that a good deal of disparity by scale exists here, as in many other, less " well-belhaved" Relevant microeconomic data are harder to come by, as firm interviews proved unsuccessful in eliciting reliable data at the firm level. Tlle leading Korean timber company, however, did show a decline in its capital/labor ratio from 35.8 in 1965-66 to 27.8 in 1968-69. In Taiwan, too, once the liberalization policies of the early sixties had substantially reduced some of the major distortions in relative prices which comprise the import suibstitution syndrome, IlmarkedI labor-usilng innovations took place in the textiles, electronics, anid food-processing industries. Large-scale mushiroom ancd asparagus productioni as forilis of agricultural by-employment (similar to silk in early Japan), 2 5 combined with related processing and caliniig activities, provided major markets for surplus uliskilled labor, especially female. With time, and facilitated by the establishimenit of the Kachsiung Export Processing Zone, export substitutioll via a dramatic expansion of labor-intenlsive manufacturinig took place.
At the microlevel, on tthe basis of 20 firm interviews conducted, I found that most of the capital stretching in evidence clearly took place in fabricating, as opposed to continuous processes. 2 6 One large plastics factory produced bothi intermediate and finished products. Its board chairman reported that in the intermediate continuous process (of producing resin) the capital/labor ratio of his plant was about the samie as that of other plants of the parent company in the United States, while in the fabricating process the capital/labor ratio was about one-half of thlat of the American plants.
The use of labor is most intensive in the electronics assembly inclustry. While parts ale mainly assembled with the aid of machinles in the United States, this work is performed by women workers in Taiwan. Accordinig to the general manager of one major electronics firm, the amoutIt of labor used in assembling one television set in the Taiwan plant is 50 percent greater than that in a plant of the parent company in the United States. In fact, most of the electronics firms interviewed were making efforts in one way or another to introduce labor-intensive methods. While the capital/labor ratios in this industry have been generally rising through time the largest electronics factory in Taiwan has experienced an increase of capital by nine times and an increase of employmenlt by 16 times between 1965 and 1969. ThroughouLt the electronics industry, capital/labor ratios have apparently fallen during the sixties. Many of the managers interviewed pointed out that the wage bill was lower in spite of the substantially larger relative volume of employment.
One tentative conclusion which may be derived from these plant visits is that the closer the production process is to the raw material processing stage, that is, backward linkaiges, the smaller the chances for efficient labor/capital substitution statically or capital-stretching innovationls dynamically; the closer the process to the finislhed product stage, the greater are these possibilities.
In 1952, rice and sugar constituted 78 percent of Taiwan's export earnings. By 1969, this had shrunk to 4.8 percent. Durinig the same period, nontraditional agricultural products, includinig fresh and canned frulits and vegetables, rose from 0 to 10 percent of the total; and, most irnpressively, manufactured goods, including wood and plywood products, rose from 5 perc;nt to 69 percent of the total. The full dimensions of this structuLral chanige are recognized when it is noted again that total export earnings were rising very rapidly, at rates in excess of 20 percent annually, especially curing the 1960s.
At the macrolevel, cc-isequent to all this, industrial employment grew at rates of 3.0 percent annually between 1952 and 1959 (see table 3 ). but accelerated to 8.1 percent annually for the decade of the sixties, once the transition to export promotion had been completed. If nonagricultuLre is divided into Kuznets's M and S sectors, it can be seen that the rate of labor absorption rose from 4.6 percenit annuLally in 1950-60 to 7.5 percent in 1960-69 in the M sector, and from 3.2 percent to 6.5 percent for the same periods in the S sector.
2 7 Equally significant is the fact that once interest rates and other reformls had been completed-in addition to the exchange and land reforms which took place earlier-this trend seems to have accelerated-for the 1964-65 period the relevant rates are 8.7 percent for the M sector and 7.2 percent for the S sector.
In conclusion, the above, largely episodal approach, is consistent with, though it admiiittedly does not conclusively prove, niy maini point, that the typical developing country, especially one whiicih is opeln and not too large in size, can expect-with appropriate policy changes taking 
